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Introduction
It is generally in the mutual interest of immigrants and host countries to integrate immigrants in host-country labor markets. A relevant but not yet well understood policy instrument is naturalization and its regulation (Liebig 2011) . Liebig and Von Haaren (2011, p. 48 ) point out that "having the host-country nationality is generally associated with better labor market outcomes for immigrants". However, it is still unresolved to what extent this positive association is due to immigrant selection into naturalization or to potential causal effects of naturalization.
The literature distinguishes three potential effects of naturalization: reduced labor market barriers, changes in immigrant behavior, and changes in employer behavior. First, labor market barriers may consist of regulations that limit access to public sector jobs or that restrict the employment of immigrants to situations where no appropriate native candidate is available (priority tests). Here, naturalization can clearly improve the labor market opportunities of immigrants. Similarly, citizenship may affect access to higher education, to financial support for education (e.g., scholarships), or to loans and housing which is of particular importance to young immigrants. Second, immigrant behavior might respond to the opportunity of naturalization (ex ante and ex post) by increased investments in host-country specific human capital such as language and educational or occupational certificates, as well as by providing extra effort to avoid public transfer dependence. Similar to other countries, German naturalization law requires immigrants to be able to support themselves without social assistance or means-tested unemployment benefits (Liebig et al. 2010 and Guimezanes 2011) . 2 For a survey on implications of citizenship acquisition see, e.g., DeVoretz and Irastorza (2017) .
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Our study addresses the causal effect of naturalization for recent immigrants to Germany using the newly available 2013 wave of the IAB-SOEP migration sample exploiting reforms to German naturalization laws in an instrumental variables strategy. 3 The data show immigrants' naturalization status as observed in 2013. We contribute to a small international literature on the causal effects of naturalization.
To identify the causal effects of naturalization the literature has applied three methods:
following the seminal paper by Bratsberg et al. (2002) , most analyses apply longitudinal data and aim to identify causal effects conditional on person-specific fixed effects or study wage growth before and after naturalization. Bratsberg et al. (2002) find positive effects of naturalization on wage growth for the United States; in their sample of foreign-born youth first interviewed in 1979 taken from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) they find 2.6 percentage points higher wage returns to experience per year after naturalization. However, these results are not confirmed in studies using similar methods for Sweden (Ohlson 2008 , Engdahl 2011 and Norway (Bratsberg and Raaum 2011) : none of these studies finds significantly positive naturalization effects once individual fixed effects are considered. Steinhardt (2012) applies panel estimations to determine causal naturalization effects on wages for Germany. He considers administrative data for individuals who initially appeared in the data with a foreign nationality and compares the labor market outcomes of those who did and did not naturalize during the observation period. After accounting for individual fixed effects Steinhardt (2012) finds that wages for males grow 0.49 percent faster per year after naturalization. This effect is statistically significant but smaller than the one found for the U.S.
by Bratsberg et al. (2002) . He does not obtain significant wage effects for females after controlling for individual fixed effects. 3 Gathmann and Keller (2017) pursue a different approach to characterize the effects of naturalization for the German case. They exploit two reforms of the naturalization law as a quasi-experiment and estimate reduced form equations. They correlate the required number of years of residency for citizenship eligibility with labor market outcomes. 4 Based on Mikrozensus (2005 Mikrozensus ( -2010 and SOEP (1984 SOEP ( -2009 ) data they study outcomes for immigrants who arrived in Germany prior to age 23 between 1975 and 2002 . Similar to Steinhardt (2012 , Gathmann and Keller (2017) find positive selection into citizenship for a pooled sample of males and females. The authors find that reduced residency requirements and thus easier access to citizenship go along with hardly any employment and earnings effects for men and with significantly stronger labor force attachment in terms of hours worked, full-time employment, tenure, and white collar employment as well as significantly higher net incomes for females. A one year reduction in residency requirements increases female earnings by about 1.6 percent.
Finally, von Haaren-Giebel and Sandner (2016) use propensity score matching to identify naturalization effects. They study on-the-job training of first generation immigrants in Germany. Based on survey data from the SOEP for 1986-1993 and 1997-2008 , the authors find a significant positive average treatment effect of naturalization.
We contribute to the literature in four ways. First, we offer an up-to-date analysis, which covers recent immigration cohorts that have not been investigated so far; in our data the median immigration year is 1999 for men and 2000 for women. Steinhardt (2012) used data for the naturalization period 1974-2004 (with no information on the year of immigration) and Gathmann and Keller (2017) focus on individuals arriving on average in 1985/6 (SOEP) and 1989/90 (Mikrozensus) . Given that the country of origin of immigrants to Germany varies over 4 For other studies using the German citizenship law reform as a natural experiment see, e.g., Felfe and Saurer (2014) and Sajons and Clots-Figueras (2014) on child education outcomes, Avitabile et al. (2013 Avitabile et al. ( , 2014 on immigrant fertility and integration, and Sajons (2016) on outmigration. For other contributions applying instrumental variable estimation to determine the causal effects of naturalization see, e.g., Bevelander and Pendakur (2011) on voting participation and Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) on employment in Sweden, and Fougère and Safi (2011) on employment in France. 4 time naturalization effects may differ across cohorts. Second, we can use more outcomes than prior studies. For example, gross monthly earnings and gross hourly wages are not available in the Mikrozensus data and employment status and further job characteristics, could not be studied by Steinhardt (2012) . Third, as our data provide substantial detail on past in-and outmigration spells in addition to relevant biographical features, such as age, marriage, and refugee status, we can describe the timing of individual eligibility for naturalization more precisely than other studies. We contribute to the literature by testing the sensitivity of estimates to alternative and commonly used specifications of the instrument. Finally, prior studies on Germany leave some issues unanswered: Steinhardt (2012) finds positive naturalization effects only for men while, Gathmann and Keller (2017) find a stronger benefit for women.
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We offer new evidence.
Overall, we study labor market access, labor market success, and host-country investments to better understand the causal effects of naturalization and the underlying mechanisms.
We find positive correlations between naturalization and labor market success. Once we account for the endogeneity of naturalization most coefficients decline in magnitude and lose statistical significance. While males' labor market outcomes do not benefit significantly from naturalization, naturalization reduces the risks of unemployment and welfare dependence for female immigrants. This reflects that the character of German citizenship status matters more for female than for male immigrants. For both groups, the propensity to hold a permanent contract increases as a consequence of naturalization. The results are robust to modifications of samples and the instrument. Thus our findings confirm the findings of Gathmann and Keller (2017) in that naturalization as an integration policy may be more effective for female than for male immigrants. This gender-specific aspect so far has not been considered in German debates of integration policy and deserves additional attention in future research.
The income measure applied by Gathmann and Keller (2017) describes net monthly personal income, which combines labor earnings, income from self-employment and capital, as well as private pensions, and public transfers.
Next, we summarize the institutional background of naturalization in Germany. Also, we discuss how naturalization may affect different outcomes. Section three describes our data and sections four and five cover methods and results. We conclude in section six.
2.
Institutional background and mechanisms
Naturalization in Germany and its reforms
Our analysis exploits reforms to German citizenship law, which became effective in 1991 and 2000 (for the historical background see, e.g., Morjé Howard 2008) . Prior to the 1991 reform, the Nationality Act (Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, RuStAG) of 1913 regulated German citizenship acquisition. This law stipulated a principle of jus sanguinis (right of blood):
German ancestry, i.e., being born to a parent with German citizenship rather than place of birth, determined eligibility for German citizenship. The law neither defined an entitlement to acquire German citizenship for foreign nationals nor did it specify clear requirements regarding duration of residency. For decades, foreign applicants for German citizenship had to rely on ad hoc decisions of public authorities; applications could be rejected even if all legally specified requirements were met. Among these specified requirements were legal age, economic selfsufficiency, ability to support relatives, no criminal record, and the renouncement of any previous citizenship.
A reform of the Alien Act (Ausländergesetz, AuslG), which came into effect on January 1, 1991, considerably changed the nature of German citizenship law. The new legal situation curbed the power of public authorities and established the right to acquire German citizenship for foreign nationals if they met clearly defined conditions. Among these, the new law introduced a minimum residency requirement for eligibility. Immigrants aged 16-22 became eligible for citizenship after 8 years of residence in Germany, while immigrants above age 22 faced a residency requirement of at least 15 years in Germany. All immigrants had to renounce their previous citizenship and had to have no criminal record. Immigrants above age 22 had to 6 prove economic self-sufficiency and the ability to provide for their relatives without receiving public transfers. Adolescent immigrants (age 16-22) had to demonstrate 6 years of completed schooling in Germany. The spouse and minor children of applicants could be naturalized with the applicant, even if they did not meet the 15 years residency requirement.
The second substantial reform of German citizenship law came into effect on January 1, 2000. It was passed by a socialdemocrat-green coalition government with more liberal views on citizenship than the previous conservative government. This reform changed and renamed the old Nationality Act (from RuStAG to Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG), and updated the Alien Act (AuslG). It harmonized the minimum residency requirement to 8 years regardless of an immigrant's age. The reform newly required applicants to demonstrate sufficient German language skills and to profess their loyalty to the free and democratic constitutional order in
Germany. The previous requirements remained in place. Interestingly, elements of the jus soli (right of the soil) principle were introduced into German citizenship law, allowing children of immigrants to acquire German citizenship if they were born in Germany to parents living in Germany for at least 8 years.
More recently, the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz, AufenthG) replaced the Alien Act (AuslG), on January 1, 2005. Among other things, it introduced integration courses for noncitizens to improve their language skills and to provide them with basic knowledge about German society (in part these courses are mandatory). Successful participation in the course shortens the residency requirement for citizenship eligibility from eight to seven years.
In Figure 1 .1, we depict the development of the absolute number of naturalizations and in Figure 1 .2 of the share of naturalizations in the stock of foreign residents in Germany. While we see a peak in naturalization early in the 1990s, the share in the stock of immigrants always 7 remains below 5 percent, which is low by international comparison.
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Therefore, selection into naturalization may follow different patterns in Germany compared to other countries.
Mechanisms of naturalization effects
While the literature points to the dual nature of naturalization as both a determinant and a consequence of immigrant integration, we concentrate on the former relationship: we are interested in the correlation between naturalization and immigrant outcomes and in the causal effects of naturalization.
Naturalization can affect labor market outcomes through various channels and mechanisms. While most contributions to the literature focus on employment and wage outcomes, we take a broader perspective. We study the mechanisms behind these developments, as well, and investigate three groups of outcomes: indicators of labor market access, of labor market success, and of investment behaviors.
In a first set of measures, we consider indicators of labor market access. Labor market access may be affected by citizenship through hiring costs, discrimination, and formal employment restrictions; the latter may vary across countries of origins of immigrants. Also, formal restrictions such as priority tests can limit non-naturalized workers' access to certain occupations. We investigate labor market participation at the extensive and intensive margin and focus on overall employment, full-time employment, and unemployment. The international literature generally finds beneficial naturalization effects on labor market outcomes (see, e.g., the survey by Liebig and von Haaren 2011) . For Germany, Gathmann and Keller (2017) find a positive correlation between citizenship and employment for males and females. However, in their reduce form results which account for the selectivity of naturalizations, the positive employment effect disappears for men.
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For international comparisons see, e.g., Steinhardt 2012 , Morjé Howard 2008 , or Gathmann and Keller 2017 Our second group of outcomes describes labor market success. These outcomes result from bargaining and individual negotiations, which may respond to citizenship. Employers could be hesitant to hire immigrants for employment tracks with steep age earnings profiles or to incur costly investments in firm specific human capital if it is uncertain whether and for how long a worker will stay in the country. We investigate whether citizenship is associated with gross hourly wages, gross monthly earnings, holding a permanent contract, and a white collar job. Finally, we consider welfare dependence and its duration as indicators of low household income. While Steinhardt (2012) finds that males' wage growth increased after naturalization with no causal effects for females, Gathmann and Keller (2017) find a higher personal income for women but not for men among immigrants with easier access to naturalization. Here, we offer additional evidence. These authors also present findings for white collar and permanent contract employment. Their results are suggestive of positive citizenship effects on white collar (women) and permanent contract (women) employment.
Finally, we inspect the effect of citizenship on investments in host-country specific (human) capital. These investments may reflect the mechanisms, which connect labor market access and labor market success with behavioral choices related to naturalization. As outcomes of interest, we consider whether immigrants attained an educational degree in Germany. We study their self-reported language skills, in particular, speaking, writing, and reading on 1-5 scale, as well as an average measure. These indicators reflect host-country specific investments.
Additionally, we capture whether an immigrant purchased property in Germany. Given the substantial fixed costs of property transactions in Germany this measure indicates a "durable tie to the host-country", which may respond to naturalization. We consider tenure with the current employer as an indicator of investments in firm specific human capital, which may respond to the acquisition of citizenship. Finally, we look at whether the individual found a German partner after migration suggesting intensive investment in host-country culture and traditions. Unfortunately, the data do not offer specific information on individual or employer 9 investments in worker human capital. As the relevance of different mechanisms may vary for subgroups, e.g., for EU-15 or ethnic German immigrants these groups we offer robustness tests without these subsamples.
Data
The 2013 wave of the IAB-SOEP Migration sample describes recent immigrants to Germany.
It uses administrative register data of the Federal Employment Agency as a frame to draw a sample of potential immigrants to be surveyed subsequently. Our dependent variables describe labor market and investment outcomes. In particular,
we describe labor market access using indicators of being employed, full-time employed, and registered unemployed. We describe labor market success using gross hourly wages, gross monthly earnings, holding a permanent contract and a white collar job. In addition, we consider welfare dependence (i.e., unemployment benefit II receipt) and the duration of benefit receipt during the past calendar year. As indicators of investment in host-country (human) capital we consider whether an individual invested in an educational degree in Germany (completed and 7 For details on the data, see Brücker et al. (2014) , Kroh et al. (2015) and Trübswetter and Fendel (2016). 8 Of those 1,261 naturalized individuals, 399 hold a dual citizenship. ongoing), German language skills, purchased property in Germany, tenure with the current employer, and having found a native German partner.
9 Table 1 presents sample means of our dependent variables for naturalized and not naturalized male and female immigrants. In Panel A, we observe higher employment rates among males than among females, and among naturalized than non-naturalized individuals.
Full-time employment rates (conditional on employment) are significantly higher for naturalized than for non-naturalized females with almost no difference by citizenship among men. Unemployment is significantly lower among naturalized individuals. In Panel B, we find higher wages and earnings for men than for women. Here, naturalized men are worse off and naturalized females are better off than their not naturalized peers. In additional categories of labor market success the jobs of naturalized immigrants are significantly more likely permanent and both gender groups are significantly less likely to receive welfare benefits (UB2) compared to non-naturalized peers. Finally, Panel C describes the groups' investments: except for the indicator of having a German born partner, all indicators suggest that naturalization is correlated with significantly higher investments in human and physical capital in the host-country, for both men and women.
The data offer information on naturalization and the calendar year of naturalization. In order to address the potential endogeneity of naturalization with respect to labor market outcomes we use an instrumental variables approach. Similar to Pendakur (2011, 2012) , we consider 'years since first eligible for naturalization' as an instrument for naturalization, which we can calculate rather precisely. In addition -and going beyond Pendakur (2011, 2012 ) -we can take advantage of reform-induced changes in eligibility rules. We exploit two major reforms (1991, 2000) , which exogenously affected the minimum residency requirement for eligibility in Germany: prior to 1991, there was no defined 9 The last measure is coded only for those immigrants who entered the country without having a partner already. right to acquire German citizenship based on explicit criteria. The Alien Act (AuslG) of January 1, 1991 introduced a minimum residency requirement of 8 years for immigrants aged 16-22 and a requirement of at least 15 years in Germany for immigrants above age 22. The reform of January 1, 2000 reduced this latter residency requirement to 8 years regardless of an immigrant's age. Our data provide monthly information on immigrants' migration biographies: for every immigrant we know the start and the end date of residence spells in Germany. This allows us to compute the exact duration of residence. We use this information to determine the precise time of first eligibility for citizenship.
The detailed nature of the data allows us to control for potential interruptions in residence in Germany and to incorporate the rules handling interruptions into our eligibility variable. Based on the Alien Act (AuslG) of January 1, 1991 stays abroad for up to 6 months are not considered as residence interruptions and thus count towards the residency duration requirements for citizenship. Stays abroad for more than 6 months, however, are considered as residence interruptions; any previous residence in Germany counts towards the requirements for citizenship only up to a maximum period of five years.
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Finally, we can use relevant biographical features, such as marriage to a German native, ethnic German status, refugee status, and naturalization of parents to account for numerous exceptions in the residency duration requirements for ethnic Germans, refugees, spouses of naturalized individuals, and children of naturalized parents. In our robustness checks we evaluate the impact of these refinements.
An important issue in coding the instrument "years since eligibility" is the treatment of individuals who are not yet eligible. We could (i) omit these observations from the analysis, (ii) include them and code the years since eligibility as zero, or (iii) include them and code negative 10 In our sample, 242 individuals interrupted their stay in Germany after their first arrival, 209 individuals interrupted their stay for at least 6 months, and in 64 cases accounting for these interruptions reduced their relevant duration of stay to five years.
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values if eligibility will be established in the future. The literature uses different approaches. Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) code their instrument to be zero for all who have not yet attained eligibility. This might upward bias the first stage coefficients, with both positive and negative slopes being overestimated. In contrast, Bevelander and Pendakur (2011, p. 76 ) appear to use negative values, "subtracting the number of years since migrating to Sweden from the number of years to eligibility". In order to reflect the exogenous difference in the eligibility to naturalize between those who entered before and after a reform and between those who spent long and short periods in the host-country, we consider negative values in our instrument of "years since eligibility" in our baseline analyses. We inspect the relevance of coding years since eligible for non-eligible individuals in our robustness tests. Our instrument therefore covers values in the interval from -8 to +53 years.
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In our sample, 40.1 percent of male and 35.3 percent of female immigrants are naturalized. On average naturalization occurred after 1.46 (0.98) years of eligibility for males (females). These figures vary substantially by country of origin with the highest naturalization rates among immigrants from the former Soviet Union countries (65.1 percent) and the lowest rates among immigrants from the original EU-15 member states (4.1 percent). In robustness tests we will compare the estimation results for various subsamples.
In addition to naturalization, we consider individual age, years in Germany, indicators for low, medium and high skill, federal state of residence, and region of origin as control variables in our estimations. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of these individual characteristics. About 30 percent of the sample originate in countries of the former Soviet Union, 30 percent are from EU member states, and 12 percent are from Turkey. In our sample, 11 Immigrants arriving in 2013 would be eligible for naturalization after 8 years, yielding the value of -8 for the indicator "years since eligible". At least one individual, who arrived decades earlier became eligible 53 years ago, e.g. via marriage to a native. 13 men are slightly older and have a longer duration of stay in Germany than females, while female immigrants are slightly better educated (please see Appendix A for variable definitions).
Empirical Method
Our objective is to describe the relationship between naturalization and labor market outcomes and to identify the causal effect of naturalization. We follow the literature and first regress labor market outcomes on naturalization to describe overall correlation patterns and to compare it to prior studies. In order to account for these issues we pursue an instrumental variable strategy in the second step of our analysis. We exploit heterogeneity in naturalization outcomes generated by our instrument, i.e., years since first eligible for naturalization. We assume that the instrument ceteris paribus affects labor market outcomes only by means of naturalization because immigrants cannot naturalize before they are eligible and the probability of naturalization increases with time since eligibility. The instrument should be highly relevant for naturalization. The exclusion restriction implies that for individuals of given age and years since migration the number of years since eligibility affects outcomes only via naturalization. The instrument identifies the effect of naturalization on labor market outcomes based on a comparison of immigrants under heterogeneous naturalization regulations but with identical age, years since migration and other characteristics: the regulatory differences allowed one person to naturalize while the other had to accumulate additional years of residence.
14 We apply a standard two stage least squares estimator (2SLS), separately for males and females.
12 First, we model whether an individual i has naturalized ( as a function of years since first eligibility :
( 1 )
We account for individual age , age squared , years in Germany ( and its square , and a set of other covariates (two education indicators, federal state of residence, and region or country of origin). We evaluate the relevance of our instrument using an F-test of the statistical significance of the θ1 estimate. Then, we consider a broad set of labor market outcomes as dependent variable and estimate:
In addition to the assumptions of instrument exogeneity and relevance, we assume monotonicity, i.e., that nobody refused to naturalize due to the onset of eligibility, which appears plausible. If our identifying assumptions hold, the estimate of β provides the causal effect of naturalization for compliers, i.e., for those individuals who naturalized because they became eligible.
Results

Linear regression estimates of labor market outcomes
In step one of our analysis we regress the outcomes of interest on the naturalization indicator to describe the overall correlation patterns conditional on a set of covariates. Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of the naturalization indicator. In additional estimations we tested and confirmed the robustness of our findings when applying bivariate probit estimators, instead.
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To improve readability of results tables we do not show standard errors. They are provided upon request.
unemployment. Naturalized men are more likely to be employed, full-time employed conditional on employment, and less likely to be unemployed compared to non-citizen first generation immigrants; however, these estimates are not statistically significant. Among women, the employment and unemployment coefficients are larger than for men and statistically significant.
The indicators of labor market success in Panel B generally show the expected patterns with large and at times highly significant coefficient estimates. Hourly wages, monthly earnings, permanent contract, and white collar employment, are positively correlated with naturalization, while welfare dependence (UB2-last year) and its intensity are significantly lower among naturalized individuals. In most cases, the coefficient estimates are larger for females than for males. As an example, females with German citizenship have roughly 11 and 17 percent higher wages and earnings than non-citizens compared to 7 and 9 percent differences for males. The gender differences in correlation patterns agree with the findings of Gathmann and Keller (2017) who find larger employment and income correlations for females than males.
Finally, in Panel C we describe some indicators of investments in (human) capital. In almost all cases, the naturalization indicator is positively and significantly correlated with the investment measures. Naturalized individuals are about 7 percentage points more likely to invest in German educational degrees, they score higher on all measures of language skills, are more likely to own property and they have a longer tenure with their current employers. We do not find positive correlations between naturalization and having a native partner.
Whereas in Panels A and B, our coefficient estimates are more significant and of larger magnitude for the female than for the male subsample this pattern is reversed in Panel C.
Overall, our findings confirm results reported by Gathmann and Keller (G&K, 2017) 
based on
Mikrozensus data for earlier immigrant cohorts.
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Instrumental variable estimations
In step two of our analysis, we investigate whether the endogeneity of naturalization biases the linear regression results in Table 3 . We apply an instrumental variables estimator with 'years since eligibility for naturalization' as our instrument. Table 4 hardly differ from those presented in Table 3 : we find positive effects of naturalization on employment and full-time employment, and negative effects on unemployment. As in Table 3 , none of these estimates is statistically significant. Therefore, we find no evidence in support of significant causal effects of citizenship acquisition on labor
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As an example, Appendix Table B .1 shows the results of the first stage regression for the full sample. The results suggest a positive selection into naturalization by education. In the presentation of IV estimates (e.g. Table 4 ) we routinely present the value of the F-statistic on the relevance of the instrument in the first stage regression. market participation for male immigrants. Similarly, the Panel A results for females hardly differ between the IV and the OLS regressions in Tables 3 and 4. The previously marginally significant coefficient in the employment equation increases in size but loses statistical significance in the IV estimation compared to OLS (see Table 3 ). The positive full-time employment effect about halves in size. Only the negative effect on unemployment remains statistically significant and almost doubles in magnitude. This suggests that we find benefits of naturalization for women in terms of significantly reduced unemployment risks. Our findings agree with G&K (2017): their reduced form estimates based on residency requirements for naturalization yield significant effects on employment for females but not for males. Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) find for Sweden substantial positive and significant naturalization effects on employment. Ohlson (2008) confirms the correlation of citizenship with employment for Sweden but does not find support for the hypothesis that becoming Swedish increases the probability of finding employment. Table 4 shows the effects on indicators of labor market success. The first two rows show the naturalization effects on hourly wages and on gross monthly labor earnings.
Panel B of
For both outcomes, the OLS estimates in Table 3 yielded positive and statistically significant associations with naturalization for men and women. These estimates respond strongly to endogeneity controls: for men, we find no positive causal effects of naturalization on wages and earnings, which suggests that the correlations in Table 3 were due to positive selection into citizenship. For females, the IV estimates continue to yield large positive coefficient estimates.
However, these are marginally statistically significant only for monthly earnings and not for hourly wages. This suggests that the response relates to the number of hours worked in addition to workers' wages and productivity as is evidenced by the positive though insignificant effect on full-time employment in Panel A. Overall, we confirm much of the international literature, 18 which finds no significant effect of naturalization on wages (e.g., Bratsberg and Raum 2011) . 15 Also, we confirm G&K (2017) who use different income measures but similarly obtain significant income effects at best for females but not for males in their reduced form estimations.
As one of the strongest results in Panel B of Table 4 , we find positive effects of naturalization on the propensity to hold a permanent employment contract for both males and females. This agrees with the correlations in Table 3 and the reduced form results for females in G&K (2017). In contrast, we do not find the expected positive naturalization effects for white collar employment. The significant negative effect of naturalization on white collar employment for men and women is counter to intuition and differs from the literature. The estimates become much smaller in magnitude and lose statistical significance, when we focus on white collar workers who perform at least somewhat demanding tasks. 16 Finally, we inspect as an indirect outcome of labor market activities whether naturalization causally affects welfare dependence. Least squares results showed negative correlation patterns, which were statistically significant in three of four cases. The instrumental variables estimations confirm negative effects. They are, however, no longer statistically significant for men, yet large and significant for females. Overall, the results in Panel B confirm that naturalization may benefit female immigrants, whereas we find only few beneficial effects for the male sample. In Panel C of Table 4 , we inspect the relevance of naturalization for host-country related investments. In almost all cases, the least squares estimates in Table 3 yielded significant   15 Given the large number of hypothesis tests performed, we emphasize only significance at the 1 percent level. 16 We limited the group of white collar workers to those reporting that they perform more than simple basic tasks, i.e., we considered only those performing at least qualified tasks. After re-coding the 180 male and 272 female white collar observations who report that they perform simple tasks (mostly without formal training), the coefficients for males and females change to -0.148 and -0.057, respectively, and are no longer statistically significant. Thus, we do not find a significant negative effect of naturalization on the propensity to work on qualified white collar jobs. positive coefficient estimates. After accounting for the endogeneity of naturalization, the results change substantially. We obtain an unexpected negative effect for female investments in German educational degrees. This finding emphasizes that the OLS results were affected by positive female selection into naturalization. Among the compliers in our sample the negative education effect is possibly related to the positive increase in labor force participation, which excludes simultaneous investments in education. The gender difference agrees with G&K who find substantially higher additions to education investments among men than among women in response to reduced residency requirements.
There is no significant average language effect for either subsample, which suggests again that a large part of the positive language coefficients in Table 3 was -at least for females -driven by selection into naturalization. Interestingly, the positive causal effects on owning property in Germany hold up to endogeneity corrections as does the tenure effect for the female subsample. This suggests that naturalization not only increases the probability of holding a permanent contract but also facilitates the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and stable employment relationships, particularly for women. For the subsample of male immigrants who entered the country without a partner we find a significant positive causal effect of naturalization on the propensity to choose a German partner. The effect for females is smaller and insignificant.
Overall, we find some positive labor market effects of naturalization for females that do not appear to be determined by selection into citizenship. For men, however, neither employment nor earnings respond to naturalization. Males and females benefit from citizenship in terms of access to permanent employment contracts and appear to invest in property more after naturalization, suggesting stronger connection to the host-country. A potential explanation for the gender differences in the effects of naturalization with respect to labor market access and labor market success (see Panels A and B) may relate to the relative change in status and independence that naturalization implies for males and females. If a larger share of females 20 immigrates as tied movers, family members, or -which is often reported for females of Turkish origin -in order to marry, whereas males independently migrate by their own volition, then taking up German citizenship might contain an empowering element for females that males cannot experience. The effect of this empowerment might be reflected in female labor market behavior. Next, we offer a variety of robustness tests to evaluate our findings.
Robustness and heterogeneity
We offer five sets of robustness tests.
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First, we modify the definition of the instrumental variable. Second, we adjust the sample of immigrants excluding immigrants from the original EU-15 countries and ethnic Germans who benefit from special regulations. Third, we exclude those observations who benefited from special family-based regulations in becoming eligible for naturalization, fourth we exclude the most recent immigrants because they did not yet have a chance to meet minimum residency requirements for naturalization, and finally we omit observations of immigrants arriving within ten years prior to the survey to reduce the potential impact of endogenous return migration.
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In Tables 5 and 6 we present the results of instrumental variables regressions after the instrument was modified. First, we replaced negative values in the instrument 'number of years since eligible for naturalization' with a value of zero, as has been done in prior contributions to the literature. This affects those observations (i.e., 216 male and 291 female immigrants) for whom the required number of years of residence for eligibility had not yet been reached (see Table 5 ). For the results in Table 6 , we instead omit all observations on immigrants who were 17 In an additional test, we considered a sample selection model for the outcomes that are observed conditional on employment. Using the number and age structure of children in the household as exclusion restrictions, we find no evidence for endogenous sample selection for men. For women, the inverse Mills ratio generates statistically significant coefficient estimates on some of the outcomes. However, the coefficient estimates of the naturalization outcome hardly change when sample selection corrections are considered.
In an additional test we modified the set of control variables by adding indicators of marital status and children in the household. Almost all results are robust to this modification; for females the estimates of unemployment and property ownership lose statistical significance once controls are added. not yet eligible for naturalization and coded only the actually observed positive number of years since eligible for naturalization.
Overall, our results are rather robust to these modifications. The first stage F statistic remains large confirming the relevance of the instrument in both settings. Tables 5 and 6 confirm the results for Panel A: we obtain no significant naturalization effects for men and significantly reduced unemployment risks for women. Similarly, the patterns regarding hourly wages and monthly earnings hold up to the modifications: only female earnings increase significantly due to naturalization. As before, the propensity to hold a permanent contract goes up and we continue to find surprisingly negative effects for white collar employment. For female immigrants, the risk and duration of welfare receipt continue to decline after naturalization. Similarly, we find no substantive differences in the results in Panel C when we compare Tables 5 and 6 to Table 4 . Overall, our results are thus robust to changes in the definition of the instrument.
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In a second set of robustness tests, we investigate whether specific subsamples affect our findings. We repeat the analyses presented in Table 4 after omitting immigrants from the core EU-15 countries, who enjoy particular freedom of international movement. Also, as ethnic German immigrants enjoy permanent residence rights and immediate access to citizenship without residency requirements, their ex ante and ex post response to naturalization may differ from other immigrants. In particular, one might expect less positive effects of citizenship for this subsample. We test whether omitting this group from the sample affects our estimates. In Table 7 , we show the estimates of the 2SLS estimation after omitting 188 male and 181 female immigrants from the original EU-15 countries. The results show slightly reduced values for the F statistics, which, however, continue to strongly support the relevance of the instrument. The
In separate estimations, we tested the robustness to alternative specifications of the instrument, e.g., quadratic and cubic versus categorical representations. Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 present the results which overall confirm our findings.
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estimates presented in Panel A hardly change with the restricted sample. In Panel B some of the estimates for females gain in magnitude and statistical significance, in Panel C some estimates for males are smaller in size and less statistically significant. Overall, however, our findings hold up to omitting immigrants from EU-15 countries from the sample.
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In Table 8 , we show the estimation results after omitting the group of ethnic German immigrants. Dropping ethnic German observations, we lose 355 male and 371 female immigrants.
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The substantial change in the number of eligible immigrants likely drives the decline in the value of the F statistics reported in Table 8 At the same time, the other effects for job characteristics in Panel B are robust to the change in sample. We see positive and significant citizenship effects on permanent contracts and again negative effects on white collar employment. Also, the previously observed effects on welfare receipt and the outcomes in Panel C are confirmed. Interestingly, the naturalization effects on finding a German partner increase for both males and females and become statistically significant. This suggests that the ethnic German subsample differs from other immigrants in 20 In a separate test, we attempted to determine the effects of naturalization for the subsample of EU 15 immigrants only. However, due to the small number of only 15 naturalization events in this group, we did not obtain statistically significant first stage results.
Ethnic German immigrants are identifiable in the data as information on their status is provided. 23 the effects of naturalization on partnerships. Overall, however, the different subsamples do not call forth substantially different results regarding labor market outcomes of naturalization.
In our third test, we reconsider our instrument. The instrumental variable reflects the individually observed number of years since becoming eligible for naturalization. In order to avoid measurement errors in the calculation of the number of years we considered special regulations for children and spouses of naturalizing immigrants: they can naturalize jointly with their parent or spouse and without meeting residency requirements if the latter meets the residency requirements and naturalizes. As such family related naturalization opportunities may be endogenous, we test for the relevance of observations with reduced required years of residency (or increased years of eligibility for naturalization) due to family issues. Table 9 presents the estimation results when we omit these observations; we lose 180 male and 240 female observations. The results in Panels A and B are basically unaffected and robust. In Panel C the negative female education effect loses significance and effects on property ownership remain positive but lose statistical significance. Once we omit family based eligibility, the positive naturalization effects on finding a German partner for males disappear and even turn negative for females. Thus, our prior findings for this outcome are not robust. The naturalization effects on partner choice identified on duration of residence, only, are insignificant for men and negative for women. Our previous findings of positive significant effects for men are driven by observations whose instrument was affected by specific family regulations. 22 Overall, however, our results are not determined by considering the full set of rules in the definition of the instrument.
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In further estimations, we additionally drop ethnic German observations from the sample used in Table 9 . Now, the negative effects amount to -0.133 for both males and females and turn insignificant. When, instead, we change the specification in Table 9 to only omit observations whose eligibility was affected by being a spouse (leaving children in the sample), the effect for males stays insignificant at a value of -0.052 and the female effect drops to -0.0937 and remains significant at the 5 percent level.
In our fourth test, we reduce our sample by omitting all those observations who arrived after 2008 and therefore may not have had an opportunity to fulfill formal residency requirements. Table 10 Finally, any analysis of first generation immigrants' whereabouts in the destination country may be subject to endogenous sample selection due to return migration. If the decisions to leave Germany after immigration is correlated with the outcomes of interest then the estimates may biased. This was tested in the studies by Steinhardt (2012) and Gathmann and Keller (2017) neither of whom found evidence supporting endogenous sample selection. We apply one of the tests performed by Gathmann and Keller (2017) who argue that a large share of return migration happens within the first ten years. When we drop those immigrants from the sample who immigrated within ten years prior to the survey we obtain the results presented in Table 11 . The sample size declined by about 30 percent but the overall patterns of the results are robust to this modification. Therefore, we are optimistic that our results are not due to endogenous return migration.
Conclusions
This study investigates the causal effect of naturalization on labor market outcomes for recent immigrants to Germany. We take advantage of new data, which provide detailed information on recent immigrants, and apply an instrumental variables strategy. Our estimation approach accounts for the potential endogeneity of naturalization by exploiting exogenous variation generated by recent reforms in naturalization regulations.
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We study outcomes describing access to the labor market, success in the labor market, and indicators of immigrant investments in host-country (human) capital. Naturalization may affect all of these outcomes. Linear regressions confirm large and statistically significant correlations of these outcomes with naturalization even conditional on years since migration, i.e., assimilation in the host-country. However, once we account for endogenous selection into naturalization, most of the correlation patterns disappear. Instead, we confirm prior findings in the literature, which show that, e.g., male immigrants' labor market outcomes such as employment, wages, and earnings do not benefit from naturalization. For female immigrants we find that naturalization reduces the risks of unemployment and welfare dependence. The positive response of female immigrants' earnings to citizenship acquisition is driven by the group of ethnic Germans and does not result for the remaining immigrant sample. We observe for males and females that the propensity to hold a permanent contract and -for females onlytenure, i.e., potential investments in firm-specific human capital and employment stability, increase due to naturalization. The gender difference in naturalization effects reflects that the character of German citizenship status matters more for female than for male immigrants.
Possibly, it provides a sense of independence and empowerment.
Given that we test numerous hypotheses we need to caution against the risk of type-II errors, i.e., erroneous indications of statistical significance. However, as one of our main results is the finding that male immigrants' labor market success does not respond to naturalization and as the findings confirming naturalization effects are corroborated with various samples and specifications, we are confident that our core conclusions are robust.
Overall, our results for men do not yield positive causal effects of naturalization on labor market integration or -vice versa -that the labor market discriminates against workers based on their citizenship. Among women, naturalization appears to enhance employment prospects.
In addition, naturalization may affect immigrant investments in host-country specific capital.
This suggests that the value of naturalization policies as an instrument to support overall 26 immigrant integration may be limited and its effects may differ by gender. Future research should pay specific attention to gender differences. Our results do not support the use of access to citizenship as an instrument to assist the integration of, e.g., the predominantly male refugee population. Note: see Table 4 . Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013). Note: see Table 4 . Source: IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (2013). 
Appendix A: Data Appendix
A.1 Variables of central interest:
In contrast to the German Mikrozensus and SOEP datasets, the IAB-SOEP Migration sample explicitly provides information on the "year of naturalization". Thus, this information does not have to be imputed from changes in the reported citizenship.
Our indicator of "naturalization (0/1)" takes the value one if an individual is naturalized at the date of survey, in 2013.
"Years spent in Germany" (YSM) is computed from monthly spell data on migration biographies, adding up all periods of residence in Germany up to the date of survey, in 2013.
Interruptions in residence for up to 6 months count towards the residency requirement for citizenship. Interruptions in residence for more than 6 months do not count towards the total years spent in Germany. Any period of prior residence in Germany is capped at five years after an individual left the country for more than 6 months.
"Year of first eligibility" is the year in which an individual becomes eligible for German citizenship for the first time. It is based on our own computations of the individual years of residency in Germany (Years spent in Germany). We take into account changes in the German law with respect to residency requirements for citizenship and exceptions in these requirements for ethnic Germans, refugees, spouses of German (naturalizing) citizens and children of naturalizing parents.
"Years since eligibility" is measured by counting the number of years since the year of becoming eligible for German citizenship for the first time up to the survey date in 2013.
A.2 Other control variables:
Based on the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) we distinguish between low-skilled (pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education, ISCED levels 0-2), medium-skilled (upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education, ISCED levels 3-4) and high-skilled immigrants (first and second stages of tertiary education, ISCED levels 5-6). The few cases (N=77) with missing information are added to the reference group of lowskilled workers. Without these additional cases, the share of low-skilled males and females is slightly lower at .319 and .316, respectively.
For the region of origin we distinguish between immigrants from the original EU-15 
A.3 Dependent variables:
Indicators of labor market access (Panel A):
"Employed (0/1)" takes the value one for all individuals who are in employment, whether they are employed full-time, part-time, marginally, or in an apprenticeship. 
